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I.

INTRODUCTION

A growing number of courts are recognizing a new First Amendment
doctrine governing regulation of a category of expression known as "professional
speech." Courts invoking this new doctrine generally define professional speech
as expression by persons in a regulated profession, such as medicine or law, and
usually (but not always) limit the application of the doctrine to contexts in which
the professional is rendering counsel or advice, such as a doctor to a patient or a
lawyer to a client. The professional speech doctrine is generally used by courts
to reduce the level of First Amendment protection professionals receive for their
expression.
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It is not at all clear, however, that courts recognizing the professional
speech doctrine intend it to encompass what are often thought of as the learned
professions, such as law or medicine. Because the doctrine is often grounded in
the basic supposition that the power of the government to license an activity
carries with it an included power to regulate the speech of those exercising their
licenses, the doctrine may well be expanded on to include virtually any licensed
calling, from doctors and lawyers, to dentists, psychologists, architects,
pharmacists, investment advisors, pilots, engineers, nurses, physical therapists,
teachers, truck drivers, bartenders, hair stylists, or fortune tellers.
The professional speech doctrine is gaining momentum. Until the
Supreme Court formally certifies it as an established First Amendment principle,
however, it has only provisional stature on the First Amendment landscape. The
purpose of this Article is to arrest the momentum of the professional speech
doctrine, and urge its rejection. The thesis of this Article is that recognition of
the professional speech doctrine will result in allowing government censorship
of professional expression that ought to receive robust First Amendment
protection, and that in those instances in which it is appropriate to permit
regulation of professional speech, existing First Amendment doctrines are
perfectly suited to the task. In considering how best to steer the evolution of First
Amendment jurisprudence, it makes sense to borrow from the first rule of
medicine: "do no harm." Acceptance of a new professional speech doctrine will
do more harm than good, and is not needed to provide government regulators
with the space required to impose appropriate restrictions on the conduct and
expression of professionals in relation to their clients, in those instances in which
such regulation is justified.
This Article begins with an overview of the recent federal appellate
decisions that have precipitated the new debate over whether the professional
speech doctrine should be recognized, and if it is to be recognized, the shape it
should take. The Article then proceeds to make a case against recognition of the
professional speech doctrine. That exploration starts with a fresh look at the
Supreme Court opinions that are typically cited as justification for recognition of
the doctrine, arguing that those opinions do not, when examined closely, provide
any persuasive justification for recognizing the doctrine. The Article then turns
to the larger backdrop of First Amendment jurisprudence, beginning with an
overview of the general case against the proliferation of new doctrinal categories
created to reduce protection for freedom of speech. This is followed by a look at
three existing First Amendment categories that have been invoked as supporting
the recognition of a free-standing professional speech doctrine: the commercial
speech doctrine, the government employment speech doctrine, and the doctrine
governing conditions attached to speech subsidized by the government. The
argument advanced is that these three doctrines do not provide convincing
support, alone or in combination, for creating a new professional speech category
with reduced free speech protection. The final substantive section of this Article
loops back to one of the opening contentions made by proponents of a
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professional speech doctrine, the fundamental premise that the power of
government to license professionals necessarily contemplates a lesser-included
power to significantly regulate the speech of professionals. Returning to the
Supreme Court decisions that are usually credited as the progenitors of the
professional speech doctrine, this final section argues that in fact those cases, and
other long-standing First Amendment principles, instead stand for the
proposition that there are certain aspects of expressive activity, whether engaged
in by "professionals" or not, that the government may not presume to license at
all. The Article concludes with a restatement of its driving thesis, which is that
recognition of a new professional speech doctrine is unnecessary and
inappropriate. Existing First Amendment doctrines are already available to
properly separate constitutionally protected speech by professionals from speech
by professionals that the government may constitutionally regulate. Recognizing
a new professional speech category will do more harm than good.

II.

RECENT CIRCUIT CASES RECOGNIZING
THE PROFESSIONAL SPEECH DOCTRINE

The professional speech doctrine has been shaped principally by a
handful of decisions from federal courts of appeal in the Third, Fourth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits. The decisions have focused on controversies as various as
the regulation of fortune tellers, restrictions on sex-change therapy for minors,
and limits on what physicians may say to patients regarding gun possession. As
the cases proliferate, so do proposals for the appropriate constitutional standards
governing their outcomes. Nominees range from highly deferential rational basis
review, to intermediate scrutiny, to heightened intermediate scrutiny, to strict
scrutiny.
A. Wollschlaeger: Doctors and Gun Owners
While a brief summary of all the recent federal courts of appeal cases
involving professional speech is worthwhile, none more vividly illustrates the
1
current state of doctrinal uncertainty as Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida.
In Wollschlaeger, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a facial challenge to a Florida
law limiting what doctors may ask, record about, or say to a patient concerning
the patient's.ownership of firearms. The law also prohibited certain forms of
discrimination by doctors against gun owners.2
760 F.3d 1195 (1 th Cir. 2014), vacated and superseded on reh'g by 797 F.3d 859 (11 th
Cir. 2015), vacated and superseded on reh"g by 814 F.3d 1159 (11 th Cir. 2015), and vacated and
reh'g en banc granted,No. 12-14009, 2016 WL 2959373 (11 th Cir. Feb. 3, 2016).
The court described the operation of the law in detail. See Wollschlaeger, 797 F.3d at 8692
71 ("On June 2, 2011, Florida Governor Rick Scott signed the Act into law. The Act created Fla.
Stat. § 790.338, entitled 'Medical privacy concerning firearms; prohibitions; penalties;
exceptions,' and amended the Florida Patient's Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, Fla. Stat. §
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The original panel opinion in Wollschlaegerwas announced on July 25,
2014.3By a 2-1 vote, the majority reasoned that the professional speech doctrine
prevents First Amendment scrutiny from applying to regulations of professional
conduct that have only an incidental impact on a professional's expression.
Finding that the Florida law was indeed the regulation of professional conduct
with only an incidental impact on expression, the court applied rational basis
review to uphold the statute.
Just one year later the court took the unusual step of vacating its prior
panel opinion, sua sponte, and issuing a substitute opinion that also upheld the
law by a 2-1 vote. The panel engaged in an elaborate taxonomy of the various
forms of speech by professionals, concluding that strict scrutiny should apply to
expression by professionals to the general public but intermediate scrutiny
should apply to expression by professionals engaged in providing personalized
counsel to a patient or client.4 After positing that ordinary or heightened
intermediate scrutiny might be the correct legal standard, the panel concluded
that the law should be upheld whichever of the two might apply, holding that
Florida's interests in protecting the privacy of patients regarding gun ownership,

381.026, to include several of the same provisions. The Act also amended Fla. Stat. § 456.072,
entitled 'Grounds for discipline; penalties; enforcement,' to provide for disciplinary measures for
violation of the Act. The Florida legislature passed the Act in response to complaints from
constituents that medical personnel were asking unwelcome questions regarding firearm
ownership, and that constituents faced harassment or discrimination on account of their refusal to
answer such questions or simply due to their status as firearm owners. The Act provides, in relevant
part, that licensed health care practitioners and facilities (i) 'may not intentionally enter'
information concerning a patient's ownership of firearms into the patient's medical record that the
practitioner knows is 'not relevant to the patient's medical care or safety, or the safety of others,'
§ 790.338(1); (ii) 'shall respect a patient's right to privacy and should refrain' from inquiring as to
whether a patient or his or her family owns firearms, unless the practitioner or facility believes in
good faith that the 'information is relevant to the patient's medical care or safety, or the safety of
others,' § 790.338(2); (iii) 'may not discriminate' against a patient on the basis of firearm
ownership, § 790.338(5); and (iv) 'should refrain from unnecessarily harassing a patient about
firearm ownership,' § 790.338(6). Violation of any of the provisions of the Act constitutes grounds
for disciplinary action under § 456.072(2). Fla. Stat. § 456.072(l)(nn). Furthermore, '[v]iolations
of the provisions of subsections (1)-(4) constitute grounds for disciplinary action under [Fla. Stat.
§§] 456.072(2) and 395.1055.' Fla. Stat. § 790.338(8). Thus, if the Board of Medicine of the Florida
Department of Health (the "Board") finds that a physician has violated the Act, the physician faces
disciplinary measures including fines, restriction of practice, return of fees, probation, and
suspension or revocation of his or her medical license. Fla. Stat. § 456.072(2). An investigation
culminating in disciplinary action may be initiated against a physician by the Department of Health
or may be triggered by a citizen's complaint. Fla. Stat. § 456.073. The minutes of a June 2, 2011,
meeting of the Rules/Legislative Committee of the Board indicate that the Board is prepared to
initiate disciplinary proceedings against a physician who violates the Act, stating that 'the
Committee [has] determined [that] violation of [the Act] falls under failure to comply with a legal
obligation and the current disciplinary guidelines for this violation would apply.' Fla. Bd. of
Medicine Rules/Legislative Comm., Meeting Report, at 3 (Jun. 2, 2011).").
3
Wollschlaeger,760 F.3d at 1195.
4
See infra notes 171-97 and accompanying text.
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in situations in which gun ownership is not related to patient safety or medical
treatment, justified the law.5
Six months later, the panel in Wollschlaeger once again vacated its prior
opinion sua sponte. Analyzing the law now for the third time, the court applied
strict scrutiny and upheld the law yet again, reasoning that Florida had a
compelling interest in protecting the Second Amendment right to bear arms, a
corresponding compelling interest in protecting the privacy rights of gun owners,
and narrowly tailored the law to effectuate those interests. Judge Charles R.
Wilson dissented for a third time, chiding his colleagues on their ever-evolving
positions. 6 One can hardly blame Judge Wilson for not being able to resist that
critique, given the majority's invocation of essentially every standard of review
known to modem First Amendment law in the course of the litigation.
On February 3, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the third panel
decision and granted rehearing en banc, indicating that the Eleventh Circuit's
jurisprudence on the professional speech doctrine and its application to the
Florida law remains a work-in-progress.
B. Pickup, King: Sexual Orientation Change Efforts
The Ninth Circuit and the Third Circuit have both recently invoked
professional speech principles to uphold laws prohibiting state-licensed mental
health providers from engaging in "sexual orientation change efforts" with
clients who are minors under 18. 8 The laws target what is also often called
"conversion therapy" or "reparative therapy," which are aimed at trying to
eliminate homosexual attractions and foster heterosexual attractions. 9 In Pickup
v. Brown, 10 the Ninth Circuit upheld a California law forbidding such sexual
orientation change efforts for minors,' 1 applying simple rational basis review.
The Ninth Circuit held that First Amendment standards applicable to

6

See infra notes 154-65 and accompanying text.
Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1202 (Wilson, J., dissenting).

7

Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., No. 12-14009, 2016 WL 2959373 (11th Cir. Feb. 3,

5

2016).
8
See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Free Speech, Occupational Speech, and Psychotherapy, 44
HOFSTRA L. REv. 681 (2016). Professor Blitz's article is a comprehensive and entirely persuasive

analysis of First Amendment issues germane to psychotherapy, including the "talk therapy" that
precipitated passage of the laws in California and New Jersey.
9
See Jacob M. Victor, Note, Regulating Sexual Orientation Change Efforts: The California
Approach, Its Limitations, and PotentialAlternatives, 123 YALE L.J. 1532, 1534 (2014) ("This

unprecedented statute aims to prevent any mental health professional from using techniquescommonly known as 'conversion therapy' or 'reparative therapy'-that attempt to eliminate
homosexual attraction or foster heterosexual attraction when treating a minor patient.").
10
740 F.3d 1208, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2871 (2014), and cert.
denied sub nom. Welch v. Brown, 134 S. Ct. 2881 (2014).
11 CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE § 865.1 (Deering 2016).
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professional speech ought to be judged on a continuum, reasoning that First
Amendment protection is "at its greatest" when a professional is "engaged in a
public dialogue," 12 "somewhat diminished" when the professional is speaking
"within the confines of a professional relationship," 13 and at its lowest when "the
regulation [is] of professional conduct.., even though such regulation may have
an incidental effect on speech." 14 Holding that the California law regulated only
professional conduct, the court found that no elevated First Amendment review
of any kind was warranted, and sustained the law. Dissenting from a denial of
rehearing en banc, Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain, joined by Judges Carlos T. Bea
and Sandra Segal Ikuta, chastised the majority for its characterization of the law
as reaching only conduct and further argued that "[t]he Federal courts have never
recognized a freestanding exception to the First Amendment for state
professional regulations. 1 5
The Third Circuit reached a similar result, but on different reasoning, in
King v. Governor of New Jersey.1 6 King upheld a New Jersey law similar to
California's, barring sexual orientation change efforts by licensed counselors
treating minors. 17 The Third Circuit concluded "that a licensed professional does
not enjoy the full protection of the First Amendment when speaking as part of
the practice of her profession."' 18 Having thus accepted that "professional speech"
is appropriately recognized as a distinct First Amendment category, the court
stated the question before it as "whether this category receives some lesser
degree of protection or no protection at all." 19 Parting with the Ninth Circuit's
rational basis review approach, the Third Circuit in King adopted a form of
intermediate scrutiny that borrowed from the vocabulary of First Amendment
commercial speech standards, holding "that prohibitions of professional speech
are constitutional only if they directly advance the State's interest in protecting
its citizens from harmful or ineffective professional
practices and are no more
20
extensive than necessary to serve that interest.
It is worth noting at this juncture, as a preview of the arguments that will
be more fully developed later in this Article,21 that I have less quarrel with the
outcomes of King and Pickup than the doctrinal path that the courts followed to
arrive at those outcomes. It might well be that California and New Jersey could

12

Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227.

13

Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1229.

14

17

Id. at 1218 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. deniedsubnom. King v. Christie, 135 S. Ct. 2048 (2015).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-55 (West 2016).

18

King, 767 F.3d at 232.

15
16

19

Id. at 233.

20

Id.

21

See infra Part III.C.
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marshal impressive evidence regarding the damage to minors that are caused by
"conversion therapy" or "reparative therapy," evidence sufficient to satisfy a
court that the laws satisfy strict scrutiny.22 Regulations driven by the laudable
and entirely sympathetic legislative impulse to protect minors from
psychological abuse ought not be given a free pass from the normal rigors of
strict scrutiny review imposed on content-based regulation of speech under wellestablished First Amendment doctrine.2 3 Better to put the government to its
proof, than to warp First Amendment principles.
C. Moore-King: Fortune Tellers
2 4 the Fourth Circuit invoked
In Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield,
the professional speech doctrine to reject a First Amendment challenge brought
by a spiritualist, Patricia Moore-King, who practiced her calling as a fortune
teller and spiritualist under the name "Psychic Sophie," to a regime of licensure
regulations imposed by Chesterfield County, Virginia, requiring her to obtain a
special fortune teller's license, to pay a special $300 fortune teller's license fee,
and to undergo criminal backgrounds checks and other administrative processes,
in order to practice her calling. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that "[u]nder the
professional speech doctrine, the government can license and regulate those who
would provide services to their clients for compensation without running afoul
of the First Amendment,, 25 and rejected her challenge. The Fourth Circuit in
Moore-King treated the regulation of Psychic Sophie as the veritable poster child
for permissive regulation of professional speech. "[T]he relevant inquiry to
determine whether to apply the professional speech doctrine," the court
explained, "is whether the speaker is providing personalized advice in a private
setting to a paying client or instead engages in public discussion and
commentary., 26 Under this test, it was easy to read the cards: "As Moore-King
describes and as we have recounted, her psychic activities and spiritual
counseling generally involve a personalized reading for a paying client." 27 On
this finding alone, Psychic Sophie's First Amendment challenge was rejected.28

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
23
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) ("Content-based laws-those that
target speech based on its communicative content-are presumptively unconstitutional and may
be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests.").
24
708 F.3d 560, 569-70 (4th Cir. 2013).
22

25

Id. at 569.

26

Id.

27

Id.

Id. ("Within public discourse, the First Amendment requires law to respect the autonomy of
speakers rather than to protect the targets of speech; outside public discourse, the First Amendment
permits the state to control the autonomy of speakers in order to protect the dignity of the targets
28
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III.

THE CASE AGAINST THE PROFESSIONAL SPEECH DOCTRINE

The case against recognition of a new professional speech doctrine
begins with a deconstruction of the principal Supreme Court cases that are
routinely cited as the progenitors of the doctrine. The case against the doctrine
then proceeds to explain why the creation of new categories of speech receiving
diminished First Amendment protection is, appropriately, generally regarded by
the Supreme Court with great skepticism. The case continues with the assertion
that the existing doctrines often offered up as nominees supporting recognition
of a professional speech doctrine, such as the principles governing commercial
speech, government employee speech, or government subsidized speech, do not
lend convincing support for recognition of the doctrine.
A. The Ambivalent Pronouncements in Thomas, Lowe, and Casey
1. Occam's Razor
Three discussions in Supreme Court opinions, the concurring opinion of
Justice Robert Jackson in Thomas v. Collins,2 9 the concurring opinion of Justice
Byron White in Lowe v. SEC,3 and the plurality opinion in PlannedParenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,31 all appear at first blush to provide
support to the recognition of a professional speech doctrine, leading a number of
courts and commentators to express the view that those opinions actually
recognize and establish the doctrine.3 2 These three opinions, however, are not
what they're cracked up to be.
"Occam's Razor" is a philosophical proposition positing that the
simplest explanation is usually the best one.33 There are emanations of Occam's
Razor in the allure of the professional speech doctrine. A common-sense
distinction exists between the speech of a professional in the context of advising
or counseling a client and speech by a professional expressed to the public at
large. This distinction is so instinctively obvious and self-evident that it pulls us
to adopt the equally simple conclusion that client-centered speech should be
walled off as a special category. Indeed, the three Supreme Court opinions in

of speech." (quoting ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE,
(2012))).
29
323 U.S. 516, 544 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).

AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM

24

472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
32
See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014); id. at 1218 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc); Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir.
2014); Moore-King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 569-70 (4th Cir. 2013).
33 R.H. Helmholz, Ockham's Razor in American Law, 21 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 109, 110-11
(2006).
30

31
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Thomas, Lowe, and Casey, especially the first two opinions in Thomas and
Casey, strongly emphasized this client-centered context. Unlike some boundary
disputes in First Amendment law, in which the edges of the boundary can be
difficult to define (obscenity may be the most infamous example),34 demarking
the line between speech uttered "in the office" between a professional and a client
and speech in the general marketplace, such as a lawyer writing an article or a
doctor addressing a professional conference, is about as easy as First Amendment
law gets. The very simplicity of the distinction is seductive. There is a temptation
to treat professional speech, so efficiently and precisely defined as speech
delivered by a professional to a client, as its own free-standing doctrine precisely
because it is so easy to define its contours. We classify because we can.
The impulse to treat professional speech as a distinct category is further
buttressed by impressive theoretical arguments regarding the distinctive nature
of professional speech, particularly when one focuses on the learned professions,
a distinctiveness largely marked by the unique training and expertise of such
professionals. One of the strongest and most imposing efforts along these lines
is Claudia Haupt's argument that the professional speech doctrine is justified
because of professionals' inherent character as "knowledge communities" or
"communities whose principal raison d'8tre is the generation and dissemination
of knowledge. 35
It is helpful to look closely at the opinions Thomas, Lowe, and Casey, to
determine exactly what those opinions mean.
2.

Thomas v. Collins

The first inklings of a professional speech doctrine may be traced to
36
statements in a concurring opinion by Justice Jackson in Thomas v. Collins.
Texas had a law requiring union organizers to register with the state and obtain
an organizer's card. R.J. Thomas was a national union leader, President of the
United Automobile Workers ("U.A.W.") and Vice-President of the Congress of
Industrial Organizations ("C.I.O."), who traveled from his home in Detroit to
Houston to speak to a rally in Texas.37 He did not obtain an organizing card.
Thomas was held in contempt for violating an ex parte temporary restraining
order preventing him from violating the Texas statute.38 The Supreme Court, in
an opinion by Justice Wiley Blount Rutledge, held that the actions taken by
Texas against Thomas violated the First Amendment.

34

See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that

defining obscenity is "the task of trying to define what may be indefinable").
35 Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1241 (2016).
36
323 U.S. 516, 544 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
37
Id.at 520.
38 Id.at 521.
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This was a very early free speech case, decided before modem First
Amendment doctrines had yet taken much form. Justice Rutledge invoked the
"clear and present danger" test as the only readily available doctrine, stating for
the Court that "any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear
public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present
danger., 39 Thomas v. Collins was an important flexion point in the evolution of
First Amendment doctrine, a case in which the majority openly embraced the
dissenting opinions of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes from an earlier epoch, a
case that rightly deserves treatment as one of the launching points for the
explosion of highly protective free speech decisions that would follow in coming
decades. It is worth giving some emphasis to this historical point because it
underscores why a case that is rightly regarded as among the critical early
decisions marking the emergence of robust protection for freedom of speech
ought not now be repurposed and put to the service of reducing free speech
protection. For the purposes of the professional speech doctrine, the case is
notable for the Court's refusal to be persuaded by an argument advanced by
Texas that it was merely regulating business and economic activity, governing
the relationship between management and labor by requiring licensure of
professional labor organizers. The Court rejected what it described as Texas's
"business practice theory" with the pragmatic observation that "Thomas40 went to
Texas for one purpose and one only-to make the speech in question.1
Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion, pushed the issue more deeply.
Justice Jackson seemed to accept that Texas might legitimately choose to treat
labor organizers as members of a profession and to exert regulation over that
profession.41 If so, that then posed the question of where legitimate regulation of
a profession ends and protection of free expression begins. As Justice Jackson
saw it:
As frequently is the case, this controversy is determined as soon
as it is decided which of two well-established, but at times
overlapping, constitutional principles will be applied to it. The
State of Texas stands on its well-settled right reasonably to
regulate the pursuit of a vocation, including-we may assumethe occupation of labor organizer. Thomas, on the other hand,
stands on the equally clear proposition that Texas may not

39

Id. at 530.

40

Id. at 533.

As I explain later in this Article, I am not sure that treating "labor organizers" as a
"profession" requiring advance licensure is necessarily sound under the First Amendment, for the
same reasons that I doubt the First Amendment should permit licensure of journalists or fortune
tellers. But that critique of Justice Jackson's assumption is not important to understanding the
driving point of his concurring opinion, which is that Thomas could not be penalized for simply
traveling to Texas to make a labor speech without a license. See infra text accompanying notes
229-44.
41
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interfere with the right of any person peaceably and freely to
address a lawful assemblage of workmen intent on considering
labor grievances.42
Justice Jackson reconciled these two propositions by distinguishing between the
power of a state to require licensure of professionals, and the power of the state
to regulate the speech of anyone-a member of the public or a licensed
professional, to the general public-including a speech on issues that relate to
the individual's profession:
A state may forbid one without its license to practice law as a
vocation, but I think it could not stop an unlicensed person from
making a speech about the rights of man or the rights of labor,
or any other kind of right, including recommending that his
hearers organize to support his views. Likewise, the state may
prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an occupation without its
license but I do not think it could make it a crime publicly or
privately to speak urging persons to follow or reject any school
of medical thought. So the state to an extent not necessary now
to determine may regulate one who makes a business or a
livelihood of soliciting funds or memberships for unions. But I
do not think it can prohibit one, even if he is a salaried labor
leader, from making an address to a public meeting of workmen,
telling them their rights as he sees them and urging them to unite
in general or to join a specific union.4 3
Three important observations about Thomas v. Collins are in order. First,
to the extent that either the majority opinion or Justice Jackson's concurrence
might be read as acknowledging that government has legitimate power to
regulate professionals, that acknowledgement was for the purpose of insisting
that the regulation at issue before it was not the regulation of a profession, but
suppression of free speech. Second, the Court (including Justice Jackson) applied
the highest level of First Amendment protections then known to it, the clear and
present danger test.44 Finally, the issue Justice Jackson was addressing was not
the level of First Amendment protection that applies inside a licensed
professional's relationship with a client, but rather the antecedent question of
when the state could requirea license as a professional precondition to engaging
in public speech. The offense for which Thomas was charged was in essence
speaking without a license, and Justice Jackson's opinion explained why Texas
could not require a license of Thomas prior to his making a public speech at a
labor rally.

42

Thomas, 323 U.S. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring).

43

Id. at 544-45.
See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.

44
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Lowe v. SEC

The professional speech question would surface again 40 years later in
Lowe v. SEC.4 5 Christopher Lowe was an investment advisor stripped of his
license for numerous crimes, including misappropriating client funds, tampering
with evidence, and stealing from a bank.46 No longer licensed to provide
investment advice to clients, he took to publishing an "investment newsletter"
that "contained general commentary about the securities and bullion markets,
reviews of market indicators and investment strategies, and specific
recommendations for buying, selling, or holding stocks and bullion. 47 The SEC
prosecuted him for engaging in investment advising without a license. The
majority of the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens,
avoided confronting the First Amendment issues posed by the conviction, instead
construing the Investment Advisors Act as not reaching Lowe's newsletter,
holding that Lowe's letter fell within an exception in the statute for "the publisher
or business or financial publication
of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine
48
of general and regular circulation.,
Justice White, however, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and
Justice William Rehnquist, thought this a tortured bit of statutory construction,
and instead felt obligated to face the First Amendment issue. 49 Justice White,
building on Justice Jackson's opinion in Thomas, held in Lowe that the speech in
the newsletter written by Lowe did not constitute "professional speech" but was
rather speech published to the general public, and thus fully protected by the First
Amendment. 50 The critical passage in Justice White's opinion read:
These ideas help to locate the point where regulation of a
profession leaves off and prohibitions on speech begin. One who
takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to
exercise judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the
client's individual needs and circumstances is properly viewed
as engaging in the practice of a profession. Just as offer and
acceptance are communications incidental to the regulable
transaction called a contract, the professional's speech is
incidental to the conduct of the profession. If the government
enacts generally applicable licensing provisions limiting the
class of persons who may practice the profession, it cannot be
said to have enacted a limitation on freedom of speech or the

46

472 U.S. 181 (1985).
Id. at 183.

47

Id. at 185.

48

Id. at 187.

49
50

Id. at 227 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 236.

45
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press subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Where the personal
nexus between professional and client does not exist, and a
speaker does not purport to be exercising judgment on behalf of
any particular individual with whose circumstances he is
directly acquainted, government regulation ceases to function as
legitimate regulation of professional practice with only
incidental impact on speech; it becomes regulation of speaking
or publishing as such, subject to the First Amendment's
command that "Congress shall make
no law.., abridging the
51
freedom of speech, or of the press."
The observations previously made regarding Justice Jackson's agenda in
Thomas apply with the same force to Justice White's opinion in Lowe. The
purpose of Justice White's discussion of professional speech was not to limit
Lowe's expression, but expand it. Justice White, like Justice Jackson before him,
held that the professional's speech was entitled to maximum First Amendment
protection, noting that it was not individualized advice to a client. And as in
Thomas, the legal question addressed by Justice White in Lowe was whether the
SEC could punish Lowe for speaking without a license. Justice White, like
Justice Jackson, concluded that under the First Amendment, Lowe did not need
one.
The Jackson and White opinions in Thomas and Lowe, in short, do not
stand for the proposition that the First Amendment does not apply to speech
rendered by a professional in the context of a fiduciary relationship with a client.
Rather, the opinions posit that there is no First Amendment impediment to
government requiring a license for certain professional activity. They do not
purport to exhaust the range of callings for which a license might be requiredthey do not tell us, for example, whether the First Amendment might be offended
by a law requiring journalists to have a license.52 The opinions are utterly silent
on the question of what restraints the government may impose on a professional's
speech within the professional-client relationship or what standard of First
Amendment review should apply to such restraints.
4. PlannedParenthoodv. Casey
The plurality opinion in the Supreme Court's abortion regulation
53
decision, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
contained a cryptic and oblique reference to the regulation of professional
speech, without using that terminology. In a brief passage, the plurality in Casey
upheld Pennsylvania's requirement that doctors obtain informed consent at least

51

Id.at 232.

52

See infra text accompanying notes 227-43.

53

505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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24 hours prior to an abortion procedure after explaining to the patient "the nature
of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and the
'probable gestational age of the unborn child.', 54 Pennsylvania also required the
physician or qualified assistant to inform the woman "of the availability of
printed materials published by the State describing the fetus and providing
information about medical assistance for childbirth, information about child
support from the father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and other
services as alternatives to abortion. '55 The plurality's analysis of these provisions
was not especially illuminating. Turning first to the constitutionality of the
informed consent provisions under the Due Process Clause, the plurality treated
the regulations as not different in kind from the sorts of informed consent
routinely required of doctors for all medical procedures.5 6 The plurality's First
Amendment analysis of the informed consent requirements was limited to three
sentences:
All that is left of petitioners' argument is an asserted First
Amendment right of a physician not to provide information
about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated
by the State. To be sure, the physician's First Amendment rights
not to speak are implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard... but only
as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable
licensing and regulation by the State, cf. Whalen v. Roe. We see
no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician
provide the information mandated by the State here.57
Dean Robert Post, in a thoughtful exploration of this passage, has been
rightly critical of its import:
The passage is puzzling because Wooley is a precedent in which
the Court applied strict First Amendment scrutiny to a state
statute that compelled ideological speech, whereas Whalen
upheld a New York statute requiring physicians to disclose
prescriptions for certain drugs, holding in the page cited that "[i]t
is, of course, well settled that the State has broad police powers
in regulating the administration of drugs by the health
professions." Exactly how the strict First Amendment standards

54

Id. at 881.

55

Id.
Id. at 884 ("Thus, a requirement that a doctor give a woman certain information as part of
obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for constitutional purposes, no different from a requirement
that a doctor give certain specific information about any medical procedure.").
57
Id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603
(1977)).
56
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of Wooley are meant to qualify the broad police power discretion
of Whalen is left entirely obscure. 8
Robert Post argues more broadly that the First Amendment should be construed
to prohibit the state from forcing physicians to engage in "ideological speech,"
and from requiring physicians to communicate information "that the medical
profession regards as false," or prohibiting "physicians from communicating
information that the medical profession regards as true., 59 I agree with both of
those propositions, though I would go farther and suggest that they do not
exhaust the full range of First Amendment protections physicians (or other
professionals) enjoy. For the purposes of the passage in Casey, what matters is
that the plurality's on-the-fly approval of the informed consent requirements
provides virtually no guidance as to the general constitutional status of
professional speech. At most, the plurality's holding reveals that it deemed
informed consent requirements to fall generally within a range of "easy cases"
that, as explained later in this Article, would survive even strict scrutiny review.6 °
Even when reviewed under strict scrutiny, informed consent requirements ought
normally be sustained by courts as narrowly tailored to effectuate compelling
governmental interests in the preservation of patient autonomy. 61 The
Pennsylvania regulations upheld in Casey may well have approached the edge of
permissible regulation under the First Amendment, coming dangerously close to
forcing doctors to espouse the ideology of the state. Even so, however, the
plurality in Casey could plausibly have concluded that the regulations did not
cross the edge. The regulations did not require doctors to profess agreement with
the state's position, or even themselves articulate the state's position, but only to
inform patients of the existence of written materials composed by the state.
In sum, the opinions by individual Justices in Thomas, Lowe, and Casey
are of limited precedential or persuasive force. They do not establish a
proposition so sweeping as the notion that the First Amendment does not apply
at all to the regulation of speech by professionals within the bounds of a
professional-client relationship. The opinions in Thomas and Lowe only describe
when a professional may speak without a license, and do not purport to examine
the limits of regulation in cases where a licensed professional is advising a client.
The plurality in Casey does potentially establish that informed consent laws may
survive First Amendment scrutiny, but that is an unremarkable conclusion even
under strict scrutiny review 62 and Casey's three obscure sentences are hardly
enough to build a coherent body of First Amendment law.

58
Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled
Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 939, 946 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
59
Id. at 939.
60
See infra Part III.D.
61

See infra Part III.E.

62

See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
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B. Stevens and the Hazards of CreatingNew FirstAmendment Doctrines
Modem First Amendment law is largely populated by discrete doctrines
tailored to address particular recurring speech problems. A legal treatise or
casebook canvassing freedom of speech might thus include coverage on topics
as various as incitement to violence,63 true threats,64 fighting words,65
obscenity, 66 nude dancing, 67 dial-a-por, 68 libel, 69 invasion ofprivacy, 70 infliction
73
72
71
of emotional distress, prior restraints, speech of government employees,
student speech in public schools, 74 public forum law, 75 governmentally funded
speech, 76 commercial speech, 77 political campaign finance, 78 corporate political
speech, 79 regulation of judicial speech,8 ° restrictions on extrajudicial statements
of lawyers involved in litigation matters, 81 trafficking in national security
secrets,8 2 academic freedom and the speech of university professors,83 publishing
private intercepted phone conversations,84 parody and satire,85 speech in relation

63

See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

64
65

See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).

66
67
68
69
70

See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).

71
72

See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

73
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983);
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
74
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
75
See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
76
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
77
78

See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

79
80

See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).

81
82

See Gentile v. State Bar ofNev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).

83
84

See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).

85

See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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83

88
87
86
to intellectual property, confidential sources of journalists, media access,
regulation of broadcasters, 89 anonymous speech, 90 regulation of Internet media,9 1

speech of labor unions,

municipal codes governing signs, 9' captive audiences, 94

95

heckler's vetoes, or government speech,9 6 just for starters. Swirling through
these topics will be tests and concepts such as content discrimination 97 and
viewpoint discrimination;98 strict scrutiny; 99 heightened scrutiny;' 0 intermediate
scrutiny;101 time, place, or manner regulations;1 0 2 or the O'Brien standard. 0 o3 And
then there is the suggestion emanating from Justice Jackson's observation in

86

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).

87

See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).

88
89
90

See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
93
See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115, 118 (1991).
94
See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
95
See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
96
See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
97
See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226.
98
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) ("[T]he ordinance goes even
beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination.").
99
See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.
oo
See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565 (2011) ("Act 80 is designed to impose a
specific, content-based burden on protected expression. It follows that heightened judicial scrutiny
is warranted.").
101 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
102
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
103
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) ("[E]ven on the assumption that
the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First
Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is
constitutionally protected activity. This Court has held that when 'speech' and 'nonspeech'
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms. To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court
has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount;
cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." (internal citations
omitted)).
91

92
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Kovacs v. Cooper 0 4 that every method of communicating ideas is "a law unto
itself' and that law must reflect the "differing natures, values, abuses and
dangers" of each method. 10 5 In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,10 6 Justice
White captured this fractionated tradition with the simple statement: "We deal
here with the law of billboards."10 7 Against that backdrop, the creation of a new
free-standing legal doctrine for professional speech seems entirely
commonplace-it is what we do.
Yet there are perils to the recognition of new categories of speech that
enjoy diminished First Amendment protection. The better view, suggested by
Paul Sherman, is that professional speech (or what he calls "occupational
subjected to strict scrutiny, the norm for content-based
speech") should be 108
speech.
of
regulation
The most comprehensive explanation of why the creation of such new
categories of disfavored speech generally runs against the grain of First
Amendment tradition and values was written by Chief Justice John Roberts for
the Court in United States v. Stevens. 10 9 In Stevens, the Court struck down a
federal statute prohibiting the creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions
of animal cruelty. Congress passed the law out of understandable aversion to
gruesome videos, sometimes called "crush videos," of horrific treatment of
animals. 10° This was speech that had no plausible value to commend it, and the

106

336 U.S. 77 (1949).
Id. at 97 (Jackson, J., concurring).
453 U.S. 490 (1981).

107

Id.at 501.

104
105

See Paul Sherman, Commentary, Occupational Speech and the First Amendment, 128
HARV. L. REv. F. 183, 192-93 (2015) ("Taken together, these cases suggest that occupational
speech should be treated just like any other content-defined category of speech. Laws that require
an occupational license in order to provide advice to a client about a specific subject impose a
direct, not incidental, burden on speech based on the content of that speech. Such content-based
burdens on speech are subject to strict scrutiny. It is at least theoretically possible that some
subcategories of occupational speech may fall outside the scope of the First Amendment. But the
Supreme Court has made clear that categorical exceptions to the First Amendment may only be
recognized on the basis of evidence that the category of speech has been considered historically
unprotected '[f]rom 1791 to the present.' Moreover, the government bears the burden of producing
this evidence. Thus, where an occupational-licensing law burdens speech and the government can
neither satisfy strict scrutiny nor provide evidence that the narrowly defined category of regulated
speech has been considered historically unprotected, the law violates the First Amendment."
(alteration in original) (internal citations omitted)). While Professor Sherman and I reach the same
conclusion, we reach that conclusion through differently framed arguments, essentially providing
differing but complementary proofs for the same ultimate theorem.
559 U.S. 460 (2010).
109
110 Id. at 464-65 ("Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 48 to criminalize the commercial creation,
sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty... Section 48 establishes a criminal
penalty of up to five years in prison for anyone who knowingly 'creates, sells, or possesses a
depiction of animal cruelty,' if done 'for commercial gain' in interstate or foreign commerce. §
108

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss1/5

18

Smolla: Professional Speech and the First Amendment
2016]

PROFESSIONAL SPEECHAND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

85

United States understandably sought to defend the law on the theory that
depictions of animal cruelty should be added to the list of categories of
expression that receive little or no First Amendment protection.11 As the Court
aptly put it, the Government's claim was "not just that Congress may regulate
depictions of animal cruelty subject to the First Amendment, but that these
depictions are outside the reach of that Amendment altogether-that they fall
11 2
into a 'First Amendment Free Zone."
The Government's theory was that "[w]hether a given category of
speech enjoys First Amendment protection depends upon a categorical balancing
of the value of the speech against its societal costs.' 13 The Court's rejection of

this proposition was at once passionate and reproachful, admonishing the
Government that "[a]s a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage, that
sentence is startling and dangerous." ' 14 Such balancing of costs and benefits, the
Court lectured, is precisely what the First Amendment forbids, foreclosing
'1 15
deference to legislative judgments that some speech is just "not worth it."
But this balancing test, which was most eloquently described in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,116 has long been obsolete, as both a description
of free speech doctrine and a theoretical explanation of when speech is protected
and when it is not.117 The opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in Stevens captured

48(a). A depiction of 'animal cruelty' is defined as one 'in which a living animal is intentionally
maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed,' if that conduct violates federal or state law where
'the creation, sale, or possession takes place."').
II
Id. at 469 ("The Government argues that 'depictions of animal cruelty' should be added to
the list.").
112 Id. (quoting Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987)).
113 Id. at 470 (quoting Brief for United States, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010)
(No. 08-769), 2009 WL 1615365, at *8).
114
Id.
115 Id. ("The First Amendment's guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of
speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. The First Amendment
itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the
Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment
simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it. The Constitution is not a document
'prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure."' (quoting Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803))).
116 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.").
117 See generally Rodney A. Smolla, Words "Which by Their Very Utterance Inflict Injury":
The Evolving Treatment ofInherently DangerousSpeech in FreeSpeech Law and Theory, 36 PEPP.
L. REv. 317, 318-19 (2009).
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the flaw in the reasoning suggested by Chaplinsky, in an unequivocal rejection
of its balancing test as an ongoing approach to the evolution of First Amendment
doctrine: The Chief Justice admonished that "such descriptions are just thatdescriptive."' 1 8 Even as a description, the Chief Justice's characterization may
to
extended 123
be too generous, for substantial First Amendment protection is now
122
12 °

119
obscene,
much expression that is lewd,

118

profane,'

21

libelous,

insulting,

Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471.

See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (employing strict scrutiny
to protect dial-a-porn under the First Amendment).
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that obscenity is not protected under
120
the First Amendment, but announcing a three-part test for defining obscenity that effectively drew
a First Amendment line distinguishing hard-core from soft-core pornography, stating: "The basic
guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest... (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." (internal citations omitted)).
121 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 504-05 (1952) ("In seeking to apply the
broad and all-inclusive definition of 'sacrilegious' given by the New York courts, the censor is set
adrift upon a boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views, with no charts
but those provided by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies, New York cannot vest such
unlimited restraining control over motion pictures in a censor. Under such a standard the most
careful and tolerant censor would find it virtually impossible to avoid favoring one religion over
another, and he would be subject to an inevitable tendency to ban the expression of unpopular
sentiments sacred to a religious minority. Application of the 'sacrilegious' test, in these or other
respects, might raise substantial questions under the First Amendment's guaranty of separate
church and state with freedom of worship for all. However, from the standpoint of freedom of
speech and the press, it is enough to point out that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting
any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon
the expression of those views. It is not the business of government in our nation to suppress real or
imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications,
speeches, or motion pictures.").
122
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (protecting publishers from liability
119

for libel in defamation cases brought by public official plaintiffs in the absence of proof of actual
malice, defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth or falsity); see also LEONARD
W. LEVY, BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED, FROM MOSES TO SALMAN RUSHDIE

525 (1st ed. 1993) ("The Supreme Court has never decided a blasphemy case. It did, however,
decide the case of The Miracle, involving 'sacrilege,' which a state court defined as if it meant
substantially the same as blasphemy. This case, Burstyn v. Wilson, involved the censorship of a
film.").
See Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 268 (1974) (holding as
123
protected name-calling in the context of a labor dispute: "After God had finished the rattlesnake,
the toad, and the vampire, He had some awful substance left with which He made a scab. A scab
is a two-legged animal with a corkscrew soul, a water brain, a combination backbone of jelly and
glue. Where others have hearts, he carries a tumor of rotten principles. When a scab comes down
the street, men turn their backs and Angels weep in Heaven, and the Devil shuts the gates of hell
to keep him out. No man (or woman) has a right to scab so long as there is a pool of water to drown
his carcass in, or a rope long enough to hang his body with. Judas was a gentleman compared with
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and fighting words. 124 We are certainly long past the notion that regulation of
' 125
such offensive speech is not "thought to raise any Constitutional problem."
Summarizing current doctrine in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,126 the Supreme
Court declared that "[c]ontent-based laws-those that target speech based on its
communicative content-are presumptively unconstitutional and may be
justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve
compelling state interests. 127 In a powerful reminder, the Court in Gilbert
emphasized that the strict scrutiny standard is triggered by laws that either
facially discriminate on the basis of content or are motivated by a governmental
purpose to penalize disfavored views. 128 Considered as theory, Chaplinsky has
been rendered obsolete by a host of major First Amendment decisions
establishing robust protection for offensive, low-value expression of the sort the
Chaplinsky Court derided.129 As the Court in Stevens adamantly explained, the

a scab. For betraying his Master, he had character enough to hang himself. A scab has not. Esau
sold his birthright for a mess of pottage. Judas sold his Savior for thirty pieces of silver. Benedict
Arnold sold his country for a promise of a commission in the British Army. The scab sells his
birthright, country, his wife, his children and his fellowmen for an unfulfilled promise from his
employer. Esau was a traitor to himself; Judas was a traitor to his God; Benedict Arnold was a
traitor to his country; a SCAB is a traitor to his God, his country, his family and his class."); see
also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 1 LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4:7 (2d ed. 2016) ("The common law has
always differentiated sharply between genuinely defamatory communications as opposed to
obscenities, vulgarities, insults, epithets, name-calling, and other verbal abuse.").
124
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (striking down a conviction for wearing the
words "Fuck the Draft," and narrowing the scope of the "fight words" doctrine to speech directed
to the person of the hearer, noting: "While the four-letter word displayed by Cohen in relation to
the draft is not uncommonly employed in a personally provocative fashion, in this instance it was
clearly not 'directed to the person of the hearer."').
125
Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
126

135 S.Ct. 2218 (2015).

Id. at 2226; see also id. at 2230 ("Thus, a speech regulation targeted at specific subject
matter is content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject
matter.").
128
Id. at 2229 ("Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented by a
facially content-based statute, as future government officials may one day wield such statutes to
suppress disfavored speech. That is why the First Amendment expressly targets the operation of
the laws-i.e., the 'abridg[ement] of speech'-rather than merely the motives of those who enacted
them."(alteration in original)).
129
See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (plurality opinion) (striking
down federal law prohibiting false claims of military honors, observing that "[s]tatutes suppressing
or restricting speech must be judged by the sometimes inconvenient principles of the First
Amendment"); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460-61 (2011) ("Speech is powerful. It can stir
people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and-as it did here-inflict great pain.
On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have
chosen a different course-to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not
stifle public debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing
in this case."); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
127
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Chaplinksy balancing approach does "not set forth a test that may be applied as
a general matter to permit the Government to imprison any speaker so long as
his speech is deemed valueless or unnecessary, or so long as an ad hoc calculus
1 30
of costs and benefits tilts in a statute's favor." The Court in Stevens thus
roundly rejected the notion that its prior decisions could "be taken as establishing
a freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope
of the First Amendment." 131 Prudent judicial craftsmanship cautions to never say
never, and the Court in Stevens did not absolutely shut the door on any future
1 32
recognition of new categories of unprotected speech. Yet, the Court expressed
such recognition could ever stand on a mere calculation
extreme skepticism that
33
of costs and benefits. 1
C. ProfessionalSpeech is Not Analogous to CommercialSpeech
The regulation of professional speech might be analogized to the
regulation of commercial speech, which is governed by the intermediate standard
134
of review commonly described as the CentralHudson test. The Third Circuit
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.").
130 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460,471 (2010); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992) ("We have sometimes said that these categories of expression are 'not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech' . . . or that the 'protection of the First
Amendment does not extend' to them .... Such statements must be taken in context, however,
and are no more literally true than is the occasionally repeated shorthand characterizing obscenity
'as not being speech at all'.... What they mean is that these areas of speech can, consistently with
the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content
(obscenity, defamation, etc.)-not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the
Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their
distinctively proscribable content." (internal case citations omitted) (citing Cass R. Sunstein,
Pornographyand the FirstAmendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 615 n.146 (1986))).
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472.
131
132 Id. ("Maybe there are some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but
have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law. But if so, there is no
evidence that 'depictions of animal cruelty' is among them. We need not foreclose the future
recognition of such additional categories to reject the Government's highly manipulable balancing
test as a means of identifying them.").
133 Id. at 471 ("When we have identified categories of speech as fully outside the protection of
the First Amendment, it has not been on the basis of a simple cost-benefit analysis.").
134 Commercial speech jurisprudence is anchored in the CentralHudson test:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the
First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at
least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether
the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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in King, for example, found the analogy persuasive. 35 It is easy enough to make
the mechanical argument that professional speech is plainly not commercial
speech. The core test for identifying commercial speech is speech which does
"no more than propose a commercial transaction."'' 36 Occasionally commercial
speech is defined more broadly, as "expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience.' ' 137 Under either the core "no more" or
the broader "economic interest" tests for commercial speech, professional speech
is clearly much more than commercial. While a professional's advertising to
solicit clients is commercial speech, the professional's advice to the client is not.
The weakness in the analogy is that even within the confines of
commercial speech regulation, certain justifications for regulation have been
ruled out of bounds, yet these are the justifications that must be invoked to make
the case that professional speech and commercial speech deserve equivalent
constitutional protection. In the realm of commercial speech doctrine, the
Supreme Court has been unsympathetic to arguments that invoke paternalism or
disagreement with the substance of a commercial message when such arguments

135 King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 233 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub norn. King v.
Christie, 135 S. Ct. 2048 (2015) ("In explaining why this level of protection is appropriate, we find
it helpful to compare professional speech to commercial speech. For over 35 years, the Supreme
Court has recognized that commercial speech-truthful, non-misleading speech that proposes a
legal economic transaction--enjoys diminished protection under the First Amendment.").
136 Since 1973, no less than 12 Supreme Court opinions have invoked the "no more" test as the
core definition of commercial speech. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367
(2002) ("no more than propose a commercial transaction"); United States v. United Foods, Inc.,
533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001) (same); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996)
(same); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993) (same); Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,422 (1993)
(same); Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986) (same); Bolger
v. Youngs Drugs Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (same); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10
n.9 (1979) (same); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98 (1977) (same);
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)
(same); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)
(same). Many opinions describe the "no more" formulation as the "core" or "usual" test. United
Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at 409 (explaining that commercial speech is "usually defined" under the "no
more" test); Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 422 (describing the "no more" test at the "core
notion of commercial speech"); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66 (same). The Court has on one occasion
described it as the test. Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989)
(finding that the speakers "'propose[d] a commercial transaction,'. . . which is the test for
identifying commercial speech" (citations omitted)); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525, 574 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (invoking the "no more" test as defining
characteristic of commercial speech while arguing that commercial speech should receive same
levels of protection as political speech); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 790 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("'Commercial speech'-defined as advertisements
that '[do] no more than propose a commercial transaction,' ... -may be more closely regulated
than other types of speech." (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted)).
137
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561; In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 204 n.17 (1982).
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are proffered as the justification for regulation.13 The Court has treated such
justifications as outside the range of government interests that may be invoked
to defend commercial regulation.139 One of the most powerful themes of modem
commercial speech law is that the government may not invoke, as its "substantial
interest" justifying regulation, paternalistic manipulation of the marketplace of
ideas. 140 "Those who seek to censor or burden free expression often assert that
disfavored speech has adverse effects. But the 'fear that people would make bad
given truthful information' cannot justify content-based burdens on
decisions if
1
speech."'

14

Similarly, the government is disqualified from invoking the false cover
of commercial speech regulation to do no more than penalize expression it finds
offensive, for such a purpose is per se disqualified as the type of interest that may
142
be invoked to justify regulation: In Careyv. PopulationServices International,
the Court rejected the position that commercial speech regulation could be
justified by the government's interest in suppressing offensive expression, noting
that it had "consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive
to some does not justify its suppression.' ' 143 Elaborating, the Court drove home
that point that such "offensiveness" arguments carry no more weight in the
context of commercial speech regulation than in the context of noncommercial
speech:
Appellants suggest no distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech that would render these discredited

138
139

See cases cited infra note 140.
See cases cited infra note 140.

See Liquormart,517 U.S. at 521 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In case after case ... the Court,
and individual Members of the Court, have continued to stress... the antipaternalistic premises of
the First Amendment .. "); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("Any 'interest' in restricting the flow of accurate information because of the perceived
danger of that knowledge is anathema to the First Amendment... the Constitution is most
skeptical of supposed state interests that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government
believes to be their own good."); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496
U.S. 91, 105 (1990) ("We reject the paternalistic assumption that the recipients of petitioner's
letterhead are no more discriminating than the audience for children's television."); Riley v. Nat'l
Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 790-91 (1988) ("The State's remaining
justification-the paternalistic premise that charities' speech must be regulated for their own
benefit-is equally unsound. The First Amendment mandates that we presume that speakers, not
the government, know best both what they want to say and how to say it."); First Nat'l Bank of
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.31 (1978) (criticizing the State's paternalistic interest in
protecting the political process by restricting speech by corporations); Linmark, 431 U.S. at 97
(criticizing the State's paternalistic interest in maintaining the quality of neighborhoods by
restricting speech to residents).
141
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 577 (2011) (quoting Thompson, 535 U.S. at 374).
140

142

431 U.S. 678 (1977).

143

Id. at 701.
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arguments meritorious when offered to justify prohibitions on
commercial speech. On the contrary, such arguments are clearly
directed not at any commercial aspect of the prohibited
and form of expression the
advertising but at the ideas conveyed
14 4
core of First Amendment values.
Similarly, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,145 the Court stated that "we
have consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to
some does not justify its suppression," adding that the Court had "specifically
declined to recognize a distinction between commercial and noncommercial
this interest a sufficient justification for a prohibition
speech that would render
' 146
of commercial speech."
The claimed parallel between commercial speech and professional
speech attempts to draw support from the differential in knowledge and
experience between professionals and their clients. 147 As the Third Circuit argued
in King:
As previously discussed, professionals have access to a body of
specialized knowledge to which laypersons have little or no
exposure. Although this information may reach nonprofessionals through other means, such as journal articles or
public speeches, it will often be communicated to them directly
by a licensed professional during the course of a professional
relationship. Thus, professional speech, like commercial speech,
of
serves as an important channel for the communication
148
information that might otherwise never reach the public.
This argument, however, proves too much, for a vast part of the public
discourse that reaches non-expert readers, listeners, and viewers originates from
speakers with specialized knowledge or expertise. Indeed, a major function of
the marketplace of ideas is to enable those with superior knowledge (or claims
thereof), including members of countless professions, to spread what they know
to persons who are not experts in their fields. The professional speech doctrine
appears to accept that professionals are often engaged in speech that has as its
subject matter issues of public concern, but then assumes that because that
speech occurs in a setting involving direct communication between a

144
145
146

Id. at 701 n.28.
463 U.S. 60 (1983).
Id.at 71-72.

147 See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 234 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. King
v. Christie, 135 S. Ct. 2048 (2015).
148

Id.
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professional and a client, the speech is disqualified from the protection it would
otherwise deserve. Yet even commercial speech doctrine does not go this far.
Commercial speech doctrine is grounded quintessentially in protection
of consumers from expression that is false or misleading. When attempts are
made to push regulation outside of those core consumer protection moorings, the
regulation is typically struck down. That is the point of the hostility to
paternalism as the justification for commercial regulation.14 9 No special
"professional speech" doctrine is needed, however, to protect the consumers of
professional services from expression by professionals that is false, misleading,
criminal, tortious, or palpably unethical in some traditional sense (such as speech
covering up a conflict of interest). Application of the strict scrutiny test will
already allow for such regulation. What is then left over is the very thin,
conclusory, and paternalistic argument that consumers who receive advice from
professionals, including advice that often implicates important matters of public
discourse, need the heavy hand of the state to protect them from over-reaching
and abuse. The First Amendment, however, is grounded in exactly the reverse
set of assumptions. The First Amendment presumes that people are their own
best judge of what to say or not say, or listen to or not listen to. Clients do not
have to listen to the advice they are receiving, or even continue the relationship.
The First Amendment similarly presumes that when commercial and
non-commercial elements of expression are intertwined, the better view is to
ratchet up, not dumb down, the level of First Amendment protection. As the
Supreme Court explained in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North
Carolina,Inc.150:
It is not clear that a professional's speech is necessarily
commercial whenever it relates to that person's financial
motivation for speaking... But even assuming, without
deciding, that such speech in the abstract is indeed merely
''commercial," we do not believe that the speech retains its
commercial character when it is inextricably intertwined with
otherwise fully protected speech. Our lodestars in deciding what
level of scrutiny to apply to a compelled statement must be the
nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect of the
compelled statement thereon. 51

149

See supra note 140 and accompanying text.

150

487 U.S. 781 (1988).

Id. at 796-97 (internal citation omitted); see Ass'n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v.
Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ("Thus, when the government seeks to restrict
inextricably intertwined commercial and noncommercial speech, courts must subject the restriction
to the test 'for fully protected expression."'); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193
F.3d 781, 793 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Where the commercial and noncommercial elements of speech are
'inextricably intertwined,' the court must apply the 'test for fully protected expression.').
151
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Just as commercial and non-commercial elements of speech may be
combined in a corporation's expression, the speech of professionals, as shown in
the next section of this Article,1 52 will often involve a blend of pure "professional
advice" (such as a lawyer's explanation of the elements of a case, or a doctor's
explanation of the risks of a medical procedure), and discussion that implicates
broader topics of public discourse.153 The doctrinal response to such
combinations that is most respectful of First Amendment free speech values is to
err on the side of applying strict scrutiny.'5 4
D. ProfessionalSpeech is Not Analogous to Government Employee Speech
Fledging legal doctrines may take hold because they are perceived as
cousins to other doctrines already recognized, partaking of
"near-miss"
close
and policy justifications, and thereby deserving similar
attributes
similar factual
doctrinal treatment. A "near-miss," however, is still a miss. I have already dealt
with one near-miss, the weak parallel between professional speech and
commercial speech. I deal next with a basketful of related near-misses, all of
which may seek to draw parallels between the regulation of commercial speech
and the regulation of speech involving governmental enterprises.

152

See infra Part 1IID.

153

See infra Part III.E.

154 Of note on this point is the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor,
in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (per curiam), which involved the question of whether
Nike's public statements on labor and employment conditions in third-world factories could be
regulated as "commercial speech." See id. at 656-57. The Supreme Court initially granted
certiorari on whether a corporation could be held liable under "commercial speech" doctrine for
its political communications, expressed by the company to defend its reputation and advance its
commercial interests. See id. at 657. Because Justice Breyer's opinion is a dissent from the
dismissal of a writ of certiorari, it has no binding precedential force on this Court, and is offered
here only for its persuasive value. Yet, that persuasive value is compelling. Justice Breyer in Nike
observed that the First Amendment "favors application of the ... public-speech principle, rather
than the ... commercial-speech principle." Id. at 676 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer noted
that "the communications at issue are not purely commercial in nature. They are better
characterized as involving a mixture of commercial and noncommercial (public-issue-oriented)
elements." Id. He then noted that even the least political of the statements at issue in the case
involved commercial and noncommercial elements that were "inextricably intertwined." Id. at 677.
After examining the form, content, and regulatory regime, Justice Breyer concluded that
heightened scrutiny, not commercial speech intermediate scrutiny, should apply:
These three sets of circumstances taken together-circumstances of format,
content, and regulatory context-warrant treating the regulations of speech at
issue differently from regulations of purer forms of commercial speech, such
as simple product advertisements, that we have reviewed in the past. And,
where all three are present, I believe the First Amendment demands heightened
scrutiny.

Id. at 678-79.
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Professional speech is not the speech of the government, not the speech
of government employees, and not speech funded by government grants. There
are many professionals who do speak for the government, or work for the
government, or are funded by the government, and when they fall into those
categories, they may be subject to a number of well-established First Amendment
doctrines that eliminate or significantly reduce First Amendment speech in
contexts in which that speech is strongly connected to governmental enterprises.
Professionals who are not government employees (not government lawyers or
doctors, for example), however, are not working for the government or speaking
for the government when they interact with clients. Professionals may ply their
trades in highly regulated industries, but there is a world of constitutional
difference between a heavily regulated enterprise and a government enterprise,
and that difference should make all the difference in First Amendment analysis.
The government speech doctrine is the most recently recognized
category of unprotected speech. The government speech doctrine graduated from
passing reference in dicta in a number of Supreme Court opinions,155 to
recognition by lower courts, 156 to formal acceptance by the Supreme Court in
two opinions, PleasantGrove City v. Summum,1 57 and Walker v. Texas Division,
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. 158 The government speech doctrine exists to

enable the government to express its own viewpoints as an incident to
governance: "Thus, government statements (and government actions and
programs that take the form of speech) do not normally trigger the First
Amendment rules designed to protect the marketplace of ideas.' 59 Political
process theory provides strong theoretical justification for the government

155
See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) ("[T]he Government's
own speech.., is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny."); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys.
v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) ("The University having disclaimed that the speech is its
own, we do not reach the question whether traditional political controls to ensure responsible
government action would be sufficient to overcome First Amendment objections and to allow the
challenged program under the principle that the government can speak for itself."); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (A government entity has the right to
speak for itself: "[I]t is entitled to say what it wishes"); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 n.7 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Government is not restrained
by the First Amendment from controlling its own expression.").
156
See Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093 (8th Cir.
2000) ("First and foremost, KWMU's underwriting acknowledgments constitute governmental
speech on the part of UMSL."); Muir v. Ala. Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1044 (5th
Cir. 1982) (en banc) ("[Tihe First Amendment does not prohibit the government, itself, from
speaking, nor require the government to speak. Similarly, the First Amendment does not preclude
the government from exercising editorial discretion over its own medium of expression.").
157
555 U.S. 460 (2009).
158

135 S.Ct. 2239 (2015).

159 Id. at 2245-46.
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speech doctrine, which "reflects the fact that it is the democratic electoral process
160
that first and foremost provides a check on government speech.
Other First Amendment doctrines allow for greater latitude by the
government in regulating speech by individuals when the speech occurs within
the context of a government program: Prominent examples include the
diminished protection for expression public school students possess in relation
to school officials regulating speech within the confines of schools,1 61 the
diminished protection for expression citizens may receive when that expression
occurs within the context of a governmentally funded subsidy program, 1 62 or the
regulation of speech by government employees. 163 In all these situations, First
Amendment protection is reduced out of deference to the governmental functions
being carried out within the programs in which the expression occurs.
The quintessential example is the body of law governing the speech
rights of government employees. That Connick/Pickering/ Ceballos test, named
for the three Supreme Court cases that have shaped it,164 has two parts. 165 A court
determines whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public
concern. 166 If the court determines that answer is no, the case is over, and no First
Amendment claim may be brought.' 67 If the answer is yes, the court proceeds to
part two of the test, a balancing exercise that focuses on the strength of the
government employer's justification, taking into account the extent to which the
1 68
speech may disrupt the functioning and efficiency of the government agency.
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,16 9 the third case in this trilogy, the Supreme Court
engrafted on the test a bright-line rule regarding application of the first prong: If
an employee's expression arises from his or her official responsibilities, the
Court held, it will automatically be deemed to be speech as an employee, and not
170
speech as a citizen speaking on a matter of public concern.
Just as it is plain that professional speech is not "commercial," it is plain
that professional speech is not "governmental," under any of the various

160

Id. at 2245 (citing Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235).

161
162

See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).

163

See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).

164

Id.; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. 205, 391 U.S. 563

(1968).
166

Garcetti,547 U.S. at 418.
Id.

167

Id.

168

Id.

169

Id. at 410.
See id. at 421 ("We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their

165

170

official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.").
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doctrines described above. Yet, as in the case of commercial speech, to give the
proponents of the professional speech doctrine their fair due, they are arguing
that professional speech sharesattributes of these other settings, and should thus
also receive reduced constitutional protection. As in the case of the commercial
speech argument, however, the parallels are weak and not persuasive.
Those who favor adoption of the professional speech doctrine might be
tempted to apply a variation of the Connick / Pickering / Ceballos test to
professional speech. The "middle opinion" in the trilogy of opinions by the
Eleventh Circuit panel in Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida'71 appeared to
have something like this in mind: The court began by noting that "[s]ociety has
traditionally accorded physicians a high degree of deference due to factors such
as their superior knowledge, education, and 'symbolic role as conquerors of
disease and death."" ' 172 "This deference reaches its apex," the court observed, "in
the examination room." 173 Elaborating, the court explained the nature of the
physician-patient relationship, and the impact of the Florida law on that
relationship: "When a patient enters a physician's examination room," the court
noted, "the patient is in a position of relative powerlessness." 174 This means that
the "patient must place his or her trust in the physician's guidance and submit to
the physician's authority. 175 With this authority, the court reasoned, comes
responsibility: "To protect patients, society has long imposed upon physicians
certain duties and restrictions that operate to define the boundaries of good
medical care., 176 It was against the backdrop of this tradition, the court observed,
that Florida passed the law regarding inquiries into gun ownership. 177 The
purpose of the law, the court held, was to "protect patient privacy by restricting
irrelevant inquiry and record-keeping by physicians on the sensitive issue of
firearm-ownership." 1 78 In the court's view, the Florida law did not prevent
physicians from speaking with patients about firearms generally. 179 "Nor does it
prohibit specific inquiry or record-keeping about a patient's firearm-ownership
status when the physician determines in good faith, based on the circumstances
of that patient's case, that such information is relevant to the patient's medical
171 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014), vacated and superseded on reh'g by 797 F.3d 859 (1 1th

Cir. 2015), vacated and supersededon reh g by 814 F.3d 1159 (11 th Cir. 2015), vacated and reh 'g
en banc grantedby No. 12-14009, 2016 WL 2959373 (11th Cir. Feb. 3, 2016).
172
Wollschlaeger, 797 F.3d at 868-69 (quoting Paula Berg, TowardA FirstAmendment Theory
of Doctor-PatientDiscourse and the Right to Receive UnbiasedMedical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV.
201, 226 (1994)).
Id. at 869.
173
174

Id.

175

Id.

176

Id.

177

Id.

178

Id.

179

Id.
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care or safety, or the safety of others. 1 80 Rather, the court held, "the Act codifies
the commonsense conclusion that good medical care does not require inquiry or
record-keeping regarding firearms when unnecessary to a patient's careespecially not when that inquiry or record-keeping constitutes such a substantial
intrusion upon patient privacy.' ' 181 With this understanding of the Act, "and in
light of the longstanding authority of States to define the boundaries of good
medical practice," the court held that the Act was "on its face, a permissible
restriction of physician speech."'1 82 While doctors would remain free in any future
specific case involving any action brought against them under the Act "to assert
their First Amendment rights as an affirmative defense," the court refused to hold
the Act facially invalid.183
To its credit, the court rejected the sweeping argument advanced by
Florida that all speech between a doctor and a patient falls outside the ambit of
the First Amendment; Florida argued that in regulating what a doctor says or asks
a patient, it was regulating the practice of medicine, not expression, and thus the
First Amendment is not implicated at all. 184 Thus, statements that would be
protected by the First Amendment if uttered by strangers on a street corner would
185
be placed outside the First Amendment when made by a doctor to a patient.
The Eleventh Circuit had previously stated, in Locke v. Shore,' 86 that "[a] statute
that governs the practice of an occupation is not unconstitutional as an
abridgement of the right to free speech, so long as any inhibition of that right is
merely the incidental effect of observing an otherwise legitimate regulation.' 87
But this statement did not answer the critical question of whether a particular
regulation of a professional's speech
was merely the incidental effect of an
188
otherwise legitimate regulation.

180

Id.

181

Id.

Id.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 884 ("It would seem under this definition-indeed, under almost any measure-that
asking questions and writing down answers constitute protected expression under the First
Amendment. However, the State argues that the Act escapes First Amendment scrutiny because it
is directed toward conduct-the practice of medicine.").
185
Id. ("While seemingly conceding (as it must) that asking questions and writing down
answers would receive First Amendment protection if it occurred between strangers on a street
comer, the State asserts that because the activity is conducted by a physician as part of the practice
of the medical profession, and because the medical profession has long been subject to close
regulation by the State, the fact that the law restricts oral and written communication is of no
consequence whatever.").
186
634 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2011).
187
Id. at 1191.
188
See id.
182
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The court argued that there is a salient difference, for First Amendment
purposes, between the speech of a professional to the public at large and the
speech of a professional that is direct and personalized speech to a client, 189 a
distinction that somewhat parallels the divide between the speech of a
government employee "on the job" and the speech of an employee speaking "as
a citizen" on an issue of public concern. 190 The court posited two extremes:
Consider two hypothetical scenarios. In the first, a physician
meets with a patient in an examination room and explains the
risks of a particular surgical procedure. This conversation is
easily classified as professional speech. In the second scenario,
the same physician speaks to a crowd at a rally, extolling the
merits of a particular political candidate. It seems equally clear
that while this speech is also uttered by a professional, it is not
"professional speech."
Phrased in terms of principles, we think it is safe to say that
speech uttered by a professional in furtherance of his or her
profession and within the confines of a professional-client
relationship falls within any reasonable definition of
professional speech.
At the other end of the spectrum, speech uttered by a
professional that is irrelative to the practice of his or her
profession and outside a particular professional-client
relationship likely falls beyond the purview of professional
speech. 91
The court reasoned that "[t]he difference between the first and second
scenarios" turned on two factors: "the professional effectivity of the speechwhether the physician is speaking in furtherance of the practice of medicine or
not, and the relational context of the speech-whether the physician is speaking
within a fiduciary relationship or not."'1 92 The court advanced this analysis by
positing that the universe of speech uttered by a professional could be divided
into four categories:
First, a physician may speak to the public, in furtherance of the
practice of medicine. Second, a physician may speak to a client,
in furtherance of the practice of medicine. Third, a physician
189 Id.
190

See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).

191 Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 887 (internal citations omitted).
192 Id. at 888.
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may speak to a client, on a matter irrelative to the practice of
medicine. Finally, a physician may speak to the public, on a
matter irrelative to the practice of medicine.193
While the court's analysis on this point is not entirely free of ambiguity, the court
appeared to be suggesting a matrix that might be described graphically along the
following lines.

/I
/1"n/

rectto,

,)
t,G calpib
S

Lowest Level of First
Amendment Protection

Intermediate Level of
First Amendment
Protection

Intermediate Level of
First Amendment
Protection

Highest Level of First
Amendment Protection

The court reasoned that the government's case for regulating professional speech
is at its apex when the professional speaks in furtherance of the profession, and
at its nadir when the speech is not germane to the profession.' 94 Conversely, the
court reasoned, the free speech interests of the professional are at their highest
when the speech does not relate to the profession, and weakest when the speech
does relate to the profession. The court then posited that the government's
constitutional authority to regulate the speech of professionals is greatest when
the speech is directed to a client, but diminished when the speech is directed to
the general public.1 95
The court treated the Florida law as falling into the intersection of speech
directed to a specific client, but on matters not directly germane to medical
practice: gun ownership.' 96 It applied intermediate scrutiny to the regulation, and
proceeded to uphold it.' 97
This was an impressive analytic effort. The weakness in the court's
argument was not the internal logic of the matrix itself-the various
classifications the court imposed are logical-but the judgment that the matrix
justifiably applied to professional speech. To accept that point one must accept

194

Id.
See id.

195

Id. at 889-90.

196

Id. at 895-96.

197

Id. at 896.

193
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that abridgements of the speech of professionals who are not government
employees but private citizens exercising professional judgement to serve private
clients may be treated by government as if they were employees merely because
government has the power to license admission to the profession and regulate the
profession.
To be fair, of all the allures arguing for acceptance of a professional
speech doctrine, the most powerful focus on an interrelated cluster of concerns
regarding the unique nature of the relationship between a professional and client.
These concerns exert particular power in the arenas of law and medicine, in
which fidelity to the client or patient deservedly occupies a primacy that is
virtually mythical in its reverence and respect. These values may be distilled into
a number of related propositions, all of which are variants of the same essential
theme. First, as between the interests of the professional and the client, the
client's interests have primacy. Second, the professional and the client are not
equals in the relationship. Rather, the professional has superior knowledge,
expertise, experience, and stature in relation to the client that inherently places
the professional in a position of superior leverage and influence, thereby
justifying the intervention of the government to ensure that this influence is not
used for overbearing or abusive purposes. Third, the very notion of a
"profession" presupposes the existence of a tradition of professional norms
governing ethical behavior within the confines of a fiduciary relationship that
require acquiescence by the professional regulations that license entry into the
professions and enforce their professional ethical norms, all of which are
ultimately grounded in society's interest in safeguarding the interests of the
198
public who partake in those professional services.
These arguments suffer from what might aptly be labeled the "false
leads" of certain easy cases-common situations in which we know intuitively
that regulation of the professional's speech cannot possibly raise serious First
Amendment objections, even though we may not have quite yet puzzled out the
doctrinal and theoretical explanation why. It simply cannot be that the First
Amendment stands in the way of Bar authorities restricting the speech of
attorneys to enforce the attorney-client privilege or conflict-of-interest
disclosures. Nor can it be that the First Amendment interdicts rules of tort law
requiring physicians to obtain informed consent from patients. 199 Yet these "easy
Note that these arguments, addressed here in the context of the public / private divide, are
largely parallel to the same arguments advanced when attempting to compare professional speech
to commercial speech. To that extent, the refutation of them here has some qualities of reprise.
199
See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional
198

Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 771, 844-45 (1999) ("Although the Court has said
even less about the extent of permissible regulation of professional speech than about identifying
the category of such communications, it would seem that the scope of permissible regulation of the
physician-patient dialogue must be determined with a view to the nature of the underlying
relationship. Apart from the recognition of a predefined communicative project, the physicianpatient relationship is marked by an imbalance of authority. Patients seeking the help of a physician
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cases" do not mean that regulations of the expression of professionals within
their client relationships are invisible to the First Amendment. They simply point
to the truism that, on the merits, properly applied First Amendment principles
would sustain the power of regulators to regulate professional speech in these
instances. These are the very regulations that would typically be upheld even
under application of the "strict scrutiny" test.
To say that certain time-honored forms of regulation of the speech of
professionals would and should be upheld under application of the strict scrutiny
doctrine, however, does not mean that all such forms of regulation, properly
analyzed, would or should survive strict scrutiny. While rigorous enforcement of
the core confidentially requirements of Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional
Responsibility for lawyers may withstand First Amendment challenge, for
example, there may be other limits imposed by Rule 1.6 that would fail a First
Amendment challenge: The Virginia Supreme Court struck down an attempt by
the Virginia Bar to discipline a lawyer under Rule 1.6 for certain entries in a blog
he maintained describing the outcomes of certain concluded matters he had
handled for clients, descriptions recounting events of public record in open court
proceedings."' While the confidentiality obligation of lawyers under Rule 1.6
will certainly survive First Amendment strict scrutiny review in most of its
applications, there may be pockets in which Rule 1.6, for all its laudatory
purposes, is properly trumped by superior First Amendment principles. The

tend to lack the knowledge to evaluate their own medical condition or to understand fully the
various treatment options apart from their careful presentation by the physician. They are not privy
to the discourse of medical science and are not usually in a position to rely on their own evaluation
of the best course of action independent from their encounters and discussions with physicians. To
varying degrees, patients will 'suspend their critical faculties and defer to physicians' opinions.'
Although patients may get a second opinion, the social practice of seeking treatment from a
physician, or even a second opinion, is not a general unbounded scholarly investigation, but the
placing of trust in, and the recognition of the authority of, one or more physicians. Undoubtedly as
a result of this imbalance, the social practice surrounding medical care and advice includes the
recognition that physicians assume certain fiduciary responsibilities in the context of this
relationship.").
Hunter v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Third Dist. Comm., 744 S.E.2d 611, 620 (Va. 2013), cert.
200
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2871 (2013) ("The VSB argues that it can prohibit an attorney from repeating
truthful information made in a public judicial proceeding even though others can disseminate this
information because an attorney repeating it could inhibit clients from freely communicating with
their attorneys or because it would undermine public confidence in the legal profession. Such
concerns, however, are unsupported by the evidence. To the extent that the information is aired in
a public forum, privacy considerations must yield to First Amendment protections. In that respect,
a lawyer is no more prohibited than any other citizen from reporting what transpired in the
courtroom. Thus, the circuit court did not err in concluding that the VSB's interpretation of Rule
1.6 violated the First Amendment.") (Author's disclosure: the author of this Article, Rodney
Smolla, served as lead counsel for Mr. Hunter in the matter. While Mr. Hunter prevailed in striking
down the application of Rule 1.6 to his blog, he lost in his claim that the blog did not constitute
commercial speech, subjecting it to the requirements of the lawyer advertising rules in Virginia).
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notion that lawyers should be free to talk about the public aspects of concluded
public judicial proceedings is one of them.
E. ProfessionalSpeech is Not Analogous to Government Funding Doctrine
It is also useful to consider as a foil to the fledgling professional speech
doctrine the line of decisions dealing with the conditions government may attach
to government funding programs. These decisions fall into two opposing lines of
precedent, which exist in significant tension. On the one side are cases such as
Rust v. Sullivan, °1 the close and controversial decision in which the Court held
that restrictions on abortion counseling placed on medical providers in programs
funded under Title X of the Public Health Service Act were constitutional. °2
Rust is among a cluster of cases that have sustained federal programs refusing to
de
subsidize certain expressive activity.203 These decisions
are incongruous with
another line of decisions enforcing the "doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, ' ' 20 4 in which the Court has held that attaching strings restricting First
Amendment rights to the receipt of government funds violates the
Constitution.2 5 The Court's most ambitious effort to reconcile these two lines of
precedent occurred in Agency for International Development v. Alliance for
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
202
Id. at 173; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 3 0 0 -3 0 0 a-5 (2012).
203
See Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll.of Law v. Martinez, 561
U.S. 661 (2010) (upholding a requirement imposed by the Hastings Law School that registered
student groups open their membership to all comers, notwithstanding the objections of a religious
student group opposed to homosexuality that claimed its First Amendment rights were violated by
being forced to accept openly gay members); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983) (upholding an IRS ruling stripping Bob Jones University of tax-exempt status because of
its racist policies); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983)
(upholding a requirement that nonprofit organizations seeking tax-exempt status under 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(3) not engage in substantial efforts to influence legislation).
204
See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court 1987 Term: Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REv. 5 (1988); Rodney A.
Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw: The Price of
Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REv. 69 (1982); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1415 (1989); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the RightPrivilegeDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
205
Agency for Int'l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2321, 2328 (2013)
(striking down a provision of a federal law requiring recipients of funds to adopt a policy stating
that they oppose sex trafficking and prostitution); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533
(2001) (striking down restrictions placed on the Legal Services Corporation by Congress
prohibiting legal representation funded by recipients of LSC moneys if the representation involved
an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing welfare law); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (striking down restrictions on funding of the University of
Virginia's student organizations for religiously proselytizing publications); FCC v. League of
Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (striking down restrictions on editorializing by public
broadcasters).
201
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Open Society International,Inc.2 6 The key distinction, the Court maintained,
was between those conditions that "define the limits of the government spending
program" and those that seek to use funding as leverage "to regulate speech
outside the contours of the program itself., 20 7 The line drawn by this distinction
is often elusive, as the Court itself acknowledged, because a law that in fact seeks
to use leverage to regulate outside the law's programmatic purpose may be
crafted in such a manner that it is effectively recast as if it is defining the limits
of a spending program.2 °8
Regulation of professional speech cannot be justified as an exercise by
government in "defining the limits of a spending program," because the
regulation of professional speech is not tied to any government spending program
but to the issuance of a professional license. If, for the purposes of analogy, we
treat the grant of the license as somewhat akin to a government subsidy, then
regulation of professional speech is exposed as the very kind -of content-based
leverage over discourse that the First Amendment forbids.
Florida's imposition of restrictions on the First Amendment rights of
doctors surrounding gun ownership is a vivid example. Florida is attempting to
use the leverage of licensure to manipulate discussion among private citizensdoctors and patients-on an issue of major public importance. Florida is certainly
entitled to enter this debate through its own expression--engaging in its own
government speech on the question. Florida can presumably exert some control
over its own employees on matters relating to this issue, to the extent that the
speech in question would fall within the confines of an employee's job duties
under the Pickering/ Connick / Ceballos test. But when Florida attempts to limit
the speech of licensed professionals in the private sector on such topics, it is
restricting expression on the basis of content and viewpoint in a manner that
ought to trigger strict scrutiny review. To grant the government the benefit of a
lower level of review, such as rational basis or intermediate scrutiny, merely
because the speech occurs within the context of a professional's advice to a client
is to ride roughshod over the fundamental constitutional divide separating the
power of government to control speech within the confines of government
programs, and the power of government to control speech in the general
marketplace of ideas. Indeed, the very fact that professions typically have strong
cultural norms and sociological structures that exert peer pressure on professions
133 S.Ct. 2321, 2328 (2013).
207
Id. at 2328 ("In the present context, the relevant distinction that has emerged from our cases
is between conditions that define the limits of the government spending program-those that
specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize-and conditions that seek to leverage funding to
regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.").
208
See id. ("The line is hardly clear, in part because the definition of a particular program can
206

always be manipulated to subsume the challenged condition. We have held, however, that
'Congress cannot recast a condition on funding as a mere definition of its program in every case,
lest the First Amendment be reduced to a simple semantic exercise."' (quoting Velazquez, 531 U.S.
at 547)).
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to comport themselves ethically and professionally, actually diminishes the
strength of the government's claim that it somehow needs to step into the
professional arena to augment those forces. As Justice Breyer has noted, where
"speech is subject to independent regulation by canons of the profession ... the
20 9
government's own interest in forbidding that speech is diminished.
Indeed, to treat the expressive activity of a private professional in
relation to a client as somehow beneath the dignity of full First Amendment
protection is to fail to appreciate that major topics of public discourse that may
often play out in the context of the questions, answers, counsel, and advice
exchanged within a professional-client setting. A professional's speech in the
public arena-such as expression in a book or a speech to a conference-is
plainly part of public discourse and should receive the highest levels of
constitutional protection. It does not follow, however, that a professional's
speech within the confines of a fiduciary relationship with a client may not also
be part of public discourse. It is a false dichotomy to assume that expression in a
manifestly public sphere (a lawyer's speech to a convention) is public and
protected by the First Amendment, while expression in the office with a client is
private and not.
The Supreme Court's decision in Legal Services Corp.v. Velazquez 2'0 is
a powerful exemplar. Congress thought it could draw a sensible line between
legal services lawyers providing routine legal services to the indigent, and legal
services lawyers engaging in frontal assaults on the welfare system by bringing
broad ideological suits against the system.21 1 In holding the attempt by Congress
unconstitutional, the Court first distinguished Rust v. Sullivan, describing Rust
as a case largely grounded in a rationale akin to the government speech doctrine,
in which Congress was forcing private doctors to engage in counseling outside
the scope of the government's spending program, in a manner that effectively
transmitted the government's own message.212 For purposes of the argument I
am making here regarding the status of professional speech, the Court in
Velazquez emphasized that the speech of lawyers advising clients is "private" in
the sense of not being governmental, not "private" in the sense of not being on
matters of important public concern.213 The Court in Velazquez thus explained
that "[t]he Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the
counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to governmental
speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have explained
Rust on this understanding. 2 14 Velazquez pointedly contrasted Rust with

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 446 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
531 U.S. 533 (2001).
211 Id. at 536-37.
212
Id. at 533-34.
213
Id. at 542.
209

210

214

Id. at 541.
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Rosenbergerv. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia,215 in which the Court
struck down the University of Virginia's attempt to limit the funding of student
organizations for religious messages.2 16 The Court in Velazquez then made the
case for the high First Amendment value of the speech of lawyers advising their
legal services clients: "Although the LSC program differs from the program at
issue in Rosenbergerin that its purpose is not to 'encourage a diversity of views,'
the salient point is that, like the program in Rosenberger, the LSC program was
2 17
designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a governmental message.,
Most significantly, the Court in Velazquez eloquently described the
value of the professional speech of lawyers in the constitutional scheme.
Reminding us that "[i]t is fundamental that the First Amendment 'was fashioned
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people,' ' 218 the Court concluded that "[t]here can
be little doubt that the LSC Act funds constitutionally protected expression. 219
Restricting the speech of lawyers was deemed damaging to the interests of
clients, 220 and damaging to the larger legal system as a whole. 221 "By seeking to
prohibit the analysis of certain legal issues and to truncate presentation to the
courts," the Court noted, "the enactment under review prohibits speech and
expression
upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial
222
power.

Indeed, Velazquez strongly endorsed the traditional autonomy and
independence of lawyers as they relate to their clients and to the courts, elevating
the constitutional status of professional speech, not diminishing it. The Court
thus strongly emphasized that "[r]estricting LSC attorneys in advising their
clients and in presenting arguments and analyses to the courts distorts the legal
system by altering the traditional role of the attorneys,, 223 adding that this
distortion could occur "whether the validity issue becomes apparent during initial
attorney-client consultations or in the midst of litigation proceedings. 224
Velazquez is a powerful ruling, and may in itself clinch the argument against

215

515 U.S. 819 (1995).

216

Id.

217

Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542.

Id. at 548 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))).
218

219

Id.

220
Id. at 546 ("There often will be no alternative source for the client to receive vital
information respecting constitutional and statutory rights bearing upon claimed benefits.").
221
Id. at 544.

222

Id. at 545.

223

Id. at 544.
Id. at 545.

224
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applying anything less than full strict scrutiny review to regulation of
professional speech.
My argument that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard to apply to
speech restricting what a professional may say to a client, it bears repeating, does
not mean that the government is powerless to regulate communication between
a professional and a client.225 Even under strict scrutiny, the government
sometimes wins. What application of strict scrutiny does mean is that the
government's range of permissible regulation is limited to prevention of behavior
that is criminal, tortious, or unethical, provided that the crime, tort, or ethical
norm is independently justified by compelling government interests. Doctors, for
example, are required by tort law to obtain a patient's informed consent before
performing a medical procedure, out of solicitude for preserving the dignity and
autonomy of patients. Lawyers are required by ethical rules to retain client
confidences and disclose conflicts of interests in the service of core fiduciary
duties of confidentiality and loyalty that preserve the core integrity of the
attorney-client relationship.226 First Amendment challenges to these basic rules
governing doctors and lawyers would in most cases appropriately be deemed
frivolous. That frivolous quality, however, does not exist because the
communications are not "speech," or because the First Amendment does not
"apply" to these settings, or because the regulation is not content-based, or
because the setting of speech within a regulated industry justifies lower scrutiny,
but rather because even applying strict scrutiny, the government's compelling
justifications in such classic instances are already established, obvious, and
incontrovertible.
F. The Threshold Authority to License at All
Before ending the discussion of the appropriate level of review of
professional speech, there is one more important matter to consider, which is
whether there may be instances in which even the act of requiringa professional
license alone may in some settings violate the First Amendment.
Even the threshold decision to require a license is not immune from high
levels of First Amendment scrutiny. The opinion of Justice Jackson in Thomas

225
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 2014) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting)
("Subjecting regulations of professionals' speech to some degree of scrutiny under the First
Amendment indeed does not necessarily call their legitimacy into question. But perhaps the panel's
common sense would afford more deferential treatment to such traditional regulations as, for
example, the ethical rules forbidding attorneys from divulging client confidences. Accordingly, the
panel intimates a potentially broad exception to the First Amendment for certain categories of
speech. The Supreme Court, however, has clearly warned us inferior courts against arrogating to
ourselves 'any "freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of
the First Amendment."' (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012) (quoting
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010))).
226
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
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and Justice White in Lowe are persuasive in their holding that the First
Amendment bars requiringa license at all for certain forms of expression. 227 The
decision of the Fourth Circuit in the fortune teller's case, Moore-King v. County
of Chesterfield, Virginia,228 ignored this threshold problem of when a license
may even be required. 229 The Fourth Circuit appeared to lump all "professions"
together indiscriminately, treating the decision on when to license as routine
economic legislation that never triggers elevated First Amendment review, and
treating distinctions that the state may choose to draw among the licensing
schemes applied to various professions (imposing more onerous licensure
burdens on some than others) as merely a subsidiary form of economic regulation
not triggering First Amendment concerns.23 °
Perhaps fortune tellers were just easy pickings. Perhaps fortune tellers
were perceived by legislators as having only marginal social status on the
spectrum of professions.23 1 Imagine instead that a state were to license
journalists, requiring a professional journalist's license entailing special fees,
background checks, or competency determinations in order to practice
professional journalism. When a South Carolina legislator recently introduced a
bill requiring such licensure ofjournalists, the bill drew instant national attention
and wide condemnation as an affront to First Amendment principles.232 The
legislator would quickly walk back the bill, claiming he was just pulling

227
See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985) (White, J., concurring); Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 544 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
228
708 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2013).
229
See id.
230
See id. at 569; see also id. at 570 ("To recognize the variability inherent in occupational
regulations is not to afford the government carte blanche in crafting or implementing those
regulations. We need not delineate the precise boundaries of permissible occupational regulation
under the professional speech doctrine in this case because we hold that the County's regulation of
Moore-King's activities falls squarely within the scope of that doctrine. The County's regulations
therefore do not abridge Moore-King's First Amendment freedom of speech.").
231
See Nicole Brown Jones, Comment, Did Fortune Tellers See This Coming? Spiritual
Counseling,ProfessionalSpeech, and the FirstAmendment, 83 Miss. L.J. 639, 669 (2014) ("While
regulators may disagree with its themes and be highly skeptical of its validity, spiritual counseling
cannot be deemed inherently false, no more than any other spiritual practice that makes
unverifiable, supernatural claims. Concerns about consumer protection can be sufficiently
addressed by existing state laws that apply to all businesses, making the additional restrictions on
spiritual counselors' speech unnecessary and overly burdensome. The First Amendment requires
that spiritual counselors be given freedom to communicate with those who seek their guidance
without excessive government intervention. Regulatory schemes that target the speech of spiritual
counselors violate the First Amendment and should be invalidated by courts.").
232
See, e.g., Michael Calderone, GOP Rep. Wants Government to Register Journalists,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 19, 2016, 4:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/gop-pressfreedom us 569e8faae4b04c81376lb0fd.
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everyone's leg. 233 If so, it was a formidable pull, as the proposed "Responsible
234
Journalism Registry Law" was quite elaborate in its structure and design.

See Callum Borchers, That South CarolinaBill to Register Journalists?It Was a Ruse.,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the2016),
20,
(Jan.
POST
WASH.
fix/wp/2016/01/20/south-carolina-journalist-registry-update-it-was-a-ruse/.
See H.R. 4702, 12 1st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2016):
234
A BILL
TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY
ADDING CHAPTER 85 TO TITLE 40 TO ENACT THE "SOUTH
CAROLINA RESPONSIBLE JOURNALISM REGISTRY LAW" SO AS TO
ESTABLISH REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONS BEFORE WORKING AS
A JOURNALIST FOR A MEDIA OUTLET AND FOR MEDIA OUTLETS
THE
REQUIRE
TO
JOURNALIST;
A
HIRING
BEFORE
AND OPERATION OF A RESPONSIBLE
ESTABLISHMENT
JOURNALISM REGISTRY BY THE SOUTH CAROLINA SECRETARY
OF STATE'S OFFICE; TO AUTHORIZE REGISTRY FEES; TO
ESTABLISH FINES AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION OF
THE CHAPTER; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina:
SECTION 1. This chapter may be cited as the "South Carolina Responsible
Journalism Registry Law".
SECTION 2. Title 40 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
"CHAPTER 85
South Carolina Responsible Journalism Registry
Section 40-85-10. For purposes of this chapter:
(1) 'Journalist' means a person who in his professional capacity collects,
writes, or distributes news or other current information for a media outlet,
including an employee or an independent contractor.
(2) 'Media outlet' means a for-profit or not-for-profit publication or broadcast
program that provides news and feature stories to the public through various
distribution channels including, but not limited to, newspapers, magazines,
radio, television, and the Internet.
(3) 'Office' means the South Carolina Secretary of State's Office.
(4) 'Registry' means the South Carolina Responsible Journalism Registry.
Section 40-85-20. (A)The Secretary of State's Office shall create a registry for
the registration of persons who qualify as a journalist pursuant to this chapter.
(B) A person seeking to register shall provide all information required by the
office including, but not limited to, a criminal record background check, an
affidavit from the media outlet attesting to the applicant's journalistic
competence, and an application fee in an amount determined by the office.
(C) A registration is valid for two years and must be renewed within thirty days
of expiration.
(D)(1) The Secretary of State's Office may deny, revoke, or refuse to issue or
renew a registration if the office finds that the person:
(a) has filed an application for registration that contains a statement that is false
or misleading with respect to a material fact;
(b) has failed to pay the proper application fee or any other fee or penalty
imposed pursuant to this chapter; or
(c) has failed to comply with any provision of this chapter.
233
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(2) The Secretary of State's Office shall deny, revoke, or refuse to issue or
renew a registration if a media outlet has determined pursuant to Section 4085-40 that the person is not competent to be a journalist.
(E) Upon receipt of the required information and documents, the office within
thirty days shall provide a registration to the person for submission to a media
outlet or a letter notifying the person of the basis for denying, revoking, or
refusing to issue or renew a registration.
(F) If the office denies, revokes, or refuses to issue or renew a registration, the
office shall inform the person of the right to appeal the decision to the South
Carolina Administrative Law Court.
Section 40-85-30. (A) Before hiring or contracting with a person as a
journalist, a media outlet shall require the person to present a copy of a criminal
record background check and shall make a determination pursuant to Section
40-85-40 whether the person is competent to be a journalist.
(B) Before working as a journalist for a media outlet in this State, a person
shall provide a criminal record background check to the media outlet to
determine journalistic competence and register with the South Carolina
Responsible Journalism Registry. After registering, the person shall provide a
copy of the registration to the media outlet. A person may not work as a
journalist until the person provides a copy of a registration to the media outlet.
Section 40-85-40. (A) A person is not competent to be a journalist if:
(1) within the three years before submitting an application for registration, the
person has been determined by a court of law to have committed:
(a) libel, slander, or invasion of privacy; or
(b) a felony if the underlying offense was committed to collect, write, or
distribute news or other current information for a media outlet; or
(2) as ajournalist, the person has demonstrated a reckless disregard of the basic
codes and canons of professional journalism associations, including a
disregard of truth, accuracy, objectivity, impartiality, fairness, and public
accountability, as applicable to the acquisition of newsworthy information and
its subsequent dissemination to the public.
(B) Upon making a determination that a person is competent to be a journalist,
the media outlet shall provide the person an affidavit attesting to the person's
journalistic competence for submission to the registry.
Section 40-85-50. (A) A person who works as a journalist without registering
pursuant to Section 40-85-30(B):
(1) for a first offense, must be fined not more than twenty-five dollars;
(2) for a second offense, is guilty of a misdemeanor and must be fined not more
than one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than fifteen days, or both;
and
(3) for a third or subsequent offense, is guilty of a misdemeanor and must be
fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty
days, or both.
(B) An officer, director, or principal of a media outlet that employs or contracts
with a person as a journalist whom the media outlet knows has not registered
pursuant to Section 40-85-30(B), or whose registration the media outlet knows
has expired or been revoked, is subject to the penalties provided in subsection
(A).
(C) Upon finding that conduct of a journalist or media outlet is in violation of
this chapter, the Secretary of State's Office may order the person to cease and
desist from engaging in the prohibited conduct. A journalist or media outlet
that continues to engage in prohibited conduct in violation of an order is

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2016

43

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119

Reasonable pundits might differ on whether the practice of journalism
or fortune telling holds higher esteem in the eyes of the general public, or whether
it is even always possible to distinguish between the two, but in the eyes of the
Constitution, both callings are presumptively outside the licensure power of
government. A review of several of the foundational First Amendment decisions
of the last century demonstrates why licensing of expressive activity is generally
anathema to First Amendment principles.
In Grosjeanv. American Press Co.,235 the Supreme Court struck down a
license tax aimed at expression, which it described as a "'license tax for the
privilege of engaging in such business,' that is to say, the business of selling, or
making any charge for, advertising.,' 236 The Court engaged in a long discussion
of the history of the British Government's use of license fees and taxes to punish
freedom of press. 23 7 "It is not intended by anything we have said to suggest that
the owners of newspapers are immune from any of the ordinary forms of taxation
for support of the government,, 238 the Court explained. The key for the Court in
Grosjean was the distinction between an "ordinary" tax and a tax that targeted
freedom of the press. "But this is not an ordinary form of tax," the Court thus

subject to an administrative penalty that may not exceed five hundred dollars
for each violation of the order.
(D) A journalist or media outlet against whom a cease and desist order has
been issued may appeal to the South Carolina Administrative Law Court.
(E)A copy of an order issued by the Secretary of State's Office or the
Administrative Law Court must be maintained as part of the registry.
Section 40-85-60. The Secretary of State's Office shall retain all fees and fines
to establish and operate the South Carolina Responsible Journalism Registry."
SECTION 3. This act takes effect upon approval by the Governor.

Id.
236

297 U.S. 233 (1936).
Id. at 244.

237

Id. at 245-46 ("For more than a century prior to the adoption of the amendment-and,

235

indeed, for many years thereafter-history discloses a persistent effort on the part of the British
government to prevent or abridge the free expression of any opinion which seemed to criticize or
exhibit in an unfavorable light, however truly, the agencies and operations of the government. The
struggle between the proponents of measures to that end and those who asserted the right of free
expression was continuous and unceasing. As early as 1644, John Milton, in an 'Appeal for the
Liberty of Unlicensed Printing,' assailed an act of Parliament which had just been passed providing
for censorship of the press previous to publication. He vigorously defended the right of every man
to make public his honest views 'without previous censure'; and declared the impossibility of
finding any man base enough to accept the office of censor and at the same time good enough to
be allowed to perform its duties. Collett, History of the Taxes on Knowledge, vol. I, pp. 4-6. The
act expired by its own terms in 1695. It was never renewed; and the liberty of the press thus became,
as pointed out by Wickwar (The Struggle for the Freedom of the Press, p. 15), merely 'a right or
liberty to publish without a license what formerly could be published only with one.' But mere
exemption from previous censorship was soon recognized as too narrow a view of the liberty of
the press.").
238

Id. at 250.
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warned, "but one single239in kind, with a long history of hostile misuse against the
freedom of the press.,

Government may certainly require a general business license for a
newspaper or a fortune teller. This would indeed be routine economic legislation
not triggering any heightened First Amendment review. 240 Neutral regulations
applicable to all enterprises, such as laws of general applicability requiring a
business license to open a business, or zoning laws regulating land use without
regard to the content of expression carried on by the land use, or general laws
imposing property, sales, or income taxes, do not typically trigger First
Amendment scrutiny. It has long been recognized that the First Amendment does
not stand against subjecting expressive enterprises to neutral laws of general
applicability, from fortune telling to legal practice to operating a newspaper. The
Court stated that such "generally applicable laws do not offend the First
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental
effects on its ability to gather and report the news. 24 1
But to go beyond generally applicable laws and require a license
specifically to report news or predict fortunes is a prior restraint on purely
expressive activity.24 2 Licensure of journalists or fortune tellers is palpably
different in kind from licensure of doctors, lawyers, dentists, psychologists,
architects, pharmacists, investment advisors, pilots, engineers, nurses, physical
therapists, teachers, truck drivers, bartenders, or hair stylists.2 43 There are

hundreds, perhaps thousands, of professions that require special expertise and
competence, and governments may impose licensure requirements to protect the

239

Id.

Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138-40 (1969) (sustaining application of
antitrust laws to the press); Okla. Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1946)
(sustaining application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to the press); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-23 (1945) (sustaining application of antitrust laws to the press); Associated
Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 130-31 (1937) (sustaining application of the National Labor
Relations Act to the press).
241 Cohen v. Cowles Media, Inc., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
242 See Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227-28 (1987) ("Our cases clearly
establish that a discriminatory tax on the press burdens rights protected by the First
Amendment .... This is because selective taxation of the press-either singling out the press as a
whole or targeting individual members of the press-poses a particular danger of abuse by the
State.").
243
See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585
(1983) ("A power to tax differentially, as opposed to a power to tax generally, gives a government
a powerful weapon against the taxpayer selected. When the State imposes a generally applicable
tax, there is little cause for concern. We need not fear that a government will destroy a selected
group of taxpayers by burdensome taxation if it must impose the same burden on the rest of its
constituency."); see also Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (striking down a law making it
unlawful to "print, publish, or broadcast ... in any instrument of mass communication" the name
of the victim of a sexual offense); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(striking down Florida newspaper "right of reply" statute).
240
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public by ensuring that such competence exists. The threshold decision to
regulate an arena ought not get a free pass under the First Amendment, however.
Fortune telling is expressive and involves a leap of faith for those who indulge
in it. Legislatures may not like fortune tellers, just as they may not like
journalists, but legislative distaste for their expression, or skepticism regarding
their utility, cannot be enough, standing alone, to justify singling them out for
licensure and fees.
IV.

CONCLUSION

There are allures to the recognition of a special First Amendment
doctrine covering professional speech. The most powerful of them speak to our
concerns that consumers of professional services be protected against
overreaching by those with superior knowledge and experience. The principal
concern of the First Amendment, however, is not overreaching by professionals,
but overreaching by government. The First Amendment is grounded in the
premise that the marketplace is the better regulator of expressive activity than
government. There are powerful cultural forces at work within professions that
encourage professionals to act ethically and within professional norms. When
professionals violate hardline rules of professional conduct, disciplinary bodies
and courts may intervene, and such interventions will typically withstand any
First Amendment challenge, even when subjected to strict scrutiny review. The
application of strict scrutiny serves the valuable purpose, however, of filtering
out government regulation that is not, in the classic sense, targeted at preventing
criminal, tortious, or palpably unethical professional conduct, but instead an
attempt to skew the marketplace of ideas or invade the buffer of confidentiality
and autonomy that protects the integrity of the professional-client relationship.
Most professionals advising clients are not government employees, and are not
carrying on the government's work or carrying the government's message. The
First Amendment stands against treating them as if they are. The discourse
between a professional and client is often public discourse, and that discourse
should receive the highest levels of constitutional protection from government
interference.
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